(INTRODUCTORY MATTER)

NIXON ASSURANCE THAT TAPES DO/ NOT CONFLICT WITH HIS PUBLIC STATEMENTS

from Nixon press conference of September 5, 1973:

QUESTION: Mr. President, to follow up on the tapes question earlier, you have told us that your reasons are based on principle -- separation of powers, Executive privilege, things of this sort. Can you assure us that the tapes do not reflect unfavorably on your Watergate position, that there is nothing in the tapes that would reflect unfavorably?

THE PRESIDENT: There is nothing whatever. As a matter of fact, the only time I listened to the tapes, to certain tapes -- and I didn't listen to all of them, of course -- was on June the 4th. There is nothing whatever in the tapes that is inconsistent with the statement that I made on May 22nd or of the statement that I made to you ladies and gentlemen in answer to several questions, rather searching questions I might say, and very polite questions two weeks ago, for the most part, and finally nothing that differs whatever from the statement that I made on the 15th of August.

THESE TRANSCRIPTS TELL THE WHOLE STORY OF WATERGATE (juxtapose with portion of "unintelligible

From Nixon's TV and radio address of April 29, 1974:

In these transcripts, portions not relevant to my knowledge or actions with regard to Watergate are not included, but everything that is relevant is included -- the rough as well as the smooth, the strategy sessions, the exploration of alternatives, the weighing of human and political costs.

As far as what the President personally knew and did with regard to Watergate and the cover-up is concerned, these materials -- together with those already made available -- will tell it all.

To anyone who reads his way through this mass of materials I have provided, it will be totally abundantly clear that as far as the President's role with regard to Watergate is concerned, the entire story is there.

March 27, 1973

Z—I could—Two options: One would be to say that (unintelligible); the other would be to say the (unintelligible).

P—(unintelligible) Well, if you say (unintelligible) permission—What do you think, John? You tell him. Well, it is easier to get out of it if you say well that is not a matter (unintelligible),

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April 14, 1973 -A

H—That's the thing we've worried about all along, that somebody will get (unintelligible) what we do but we can't live by whether we (unintelligible) the (unintelligible).

P—(Unintelligible)

April 14, 1973 - C

P—He's obviously thought this through. Isn't it worthwhile to find our—I think we owe it to ourselves to find out about John Dean, for example, what he—now understand that he thinks (unintelligible) this is true from (unintelligible).

H—Alright.

E—I think that's right. Ths is probably a golden opportunity in a way.

P—Right. To find out—let me put it this way. You've got to find out what the hell he is going to say. (unintelligible) which is frightening to me, (unintelligible) rather than (unintelligible)

H—Right.

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P—I wonder if you'll (unintelligible) then—(unintelligible) I think, Bob.

H—I can't reach Magruder. There's no answer (unintelligible) over something. If he arrives here they'll let us know.

P—We better get the other things out of the way. I think we're going to be—I don't want to be hammered—(unintelligible) I don't want to—I don't (unintelligible) they'll hammer the hell out of us anyway, but I don't (unintelligible) that's a—that's just a (unintelligible) all here. We'll take—we'll take a hell of a beating (unintelligible) in the next thirty days, a lot of heat, we'll take with regard to why we aren't appearing, why we aren't going to appear before the Committee. Now, how do we answer that?

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H—I still think you can. Maybe it can't be done, but there ought to be a way to turn the Grand Jury thing strongly our way, which is that this proves the rightness of the President's approach of full cooperation with the proper process of justice which is bringing people, even at the very highest level, to account.

P—You (unintelligible) cooperation.

E—Yeah. I think we should do that.

H—And cooperating on the (unintelligible). And the value of that.

P—(Unintelligible) first man out on it should not be favored. You understand the importance of that and so forth and so on. Then I've got to (unintelligible) and get (unintelligible). Trying to think of how to use you effectively in this too.

367

Unintelligible

April 14, 1973 - C

P—Does (unintelligible) know Bob. Aren't we really sort of in a position where it would be better to know whose (unintelligible) in that damn Grand Jury. At least, pull the (unintelligible) on something there. I really think you do. And, they're (unintelligible) happy. It seems to me that a hell of a lot of the issue about do something involves our inability to (unintelligible) back that we're willing to cooperate. That we're willing to waive executive privilege and keeping our people silent. Now that's what I'm really trying to (unintelligible).

E—We will get—

H—I've always heard that that's the right—that's the point—that kind of argument.

P—Is that (unintelligible).

H—(Unintelligible) one day plus story.

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P—Then you—the way I would handle that, I would say, "Now let's take the Segretti matter"—no—"First, let's take Watergate." You say, "I had no knowledge—"(unintelligible). "Let's take the Segretti thing. Now, here are the facts."—Then I would point out—(unintelligible) point out (unintelligible) incrimination?

H—No.

E—Well, we don't know that.

H—Huh?

P—(Unintelligible) OK, John. (Unintelligible). with Segretti?

H—Well, he was clearly (unintelligible) which is totally (unintelligible) that Segretti—Segretti's instructions were that he was to do nothing illegal. And, well then answer the question how could you launch a guy out—

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P—I do feel that we should get this ready and really bounce it and I think that's the day to do it and I'd say (unintelligible) and I'd say—

H—It's ready. Oh, no, it isn't ready but it's close. But it's awful long.

P—Will it be alright?

H—I'm not so sure that (unintelligible).

P—Perfectly alright. Grand Jury. (Unintelligible) the damn (unintelligible) down to it. And if it says if the Committee doesn't, I cannot allow—I cannot allow—the (unintelligible). I mean the—"My effectiveness as an Assistant to the President will be seriously damaged." "Eroded by false charges and so forth and consequently I am making this statement now. I will make

this statement under oath. (Unintelligible) I will make this statement under oath and answer questions under oath when the Ervin Committee finally gets around to hearing me." How's that sound to you, John?

E—Sounds pretty good.

P—All right. Now I think—I will say—point out—(unintelligible) it is (unintelligible)—"I do not suggest that—" I have only tried to cover in this statement questions of charges to date. That's what I have said and it has not been—and I am sure that others will be made." And (unintelligible)

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Unintelligible

April 16, 1973 - A

P—The reason that I made the call while in Dean's presence last night was that he said Liddy was saying how he knows Liddy had told (unintelligible) or something like that. I said he must (unintelligible). Well, he thought he ought to get ahold of his attorneys. Liddy said will not (unintelligible) higher authorities. (Unintelligible) not the President, (unintelligible) Mitchell. And I said, I called Petersen (unintelligible) where to go (unintelligible) Liddy's attorney. The President is not asking for any type of (unintelligible).

499

Inaudible

April 16, 1973 - E

P—Yeah. Let me get to two quick questions before you give me whatever you've got. Three questions—one very fundamental that (inaudible) perhaps the first two are related. I (inaudible) Dean, first Magruder, with the information that I know, it seems to me that I've got to tell the (inaudible) something about that's been done (inaudible) where it would be worse. What's your reaction to that? We got to be sure that when people ask us later that we didn't—these people that are out (inaudible).

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P—There's this. This is something that we're going—you know—probably great difference of opinion in the Department of Justice (inaudible). More important for the Department of Justice is (inaudible). Presidency have (inaudible) as a result of some diligent efforts its own (inaudible). Now with (inaudible) I don't have to announce the (inaudible). We have a situation where the U.S. Attorney, in effect, the (inaudible) thing when the President has to go in and explain (inaudible).

HP—(Inaudible) for a purpose.

P—Yeah but—see—I don't—(inaudible) the damn sure (inaudible).

544

Unintelligible

April 19, 1973

P- I want these men to be (unintelligible). I know there is. I really.

W—Quite so. We (unintelligible)

P—The second point, however, I have (unintelligible) And they know that. And if—if—uh—you conclude that the best thing to do is for Haldeman to step forward and say, "you're not guilty of a doggone thing." They have released the Grand Jury notes. I've been attacked by the press; I've been (unintelligible) all this (unintelligible) outside of this office including (unintelligible). In it, one (unintelligible) regard to the (unintelligible) as to whether it affects their (unintelligible) too in regard to the President.

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